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PRACTICAL TIPS FOR INTERPRETING STATUTORY OVERRIDES
BY DEBORAH A. WIDISS
NDER OUR TRIPARTITE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, the
legislative branch is responsible for enacting statutes,
and courts are simply charged with interpreting them.
However, when laws are ambiguous or unclear, the judicial
role often involves "making" law, in the sense that the courts
fill in the gaps about what the law will mean. That said, if
Congress disagrees with a court's interpretation, it can enact
an override-an amendment to the existing statute or a new
statute that supersedes the prior judicial interpretation. The
same process can occur at the state or local level.
Thus, overrides are a key mechanism for ensuring legitimacy
supremacy and enforcing the separation of powers built into
our Constitution. However, over-
rides can only play this role if they In most insta
actually overridc-that is, they must Westlaw wait un
change how lawyers and courts
understand the law. In a series of in a decision
academic articles, I've shown that amendment affec
overridden precedents-what I have prior precedent
called "shadow precedents"- often case in
continue to hold sway.' This short
essay briefly explains some of
the challenges that can arise in interpreting overrides and
provides tips for lawyers and judges to address them. I pull
examples from employment discrimination law because that
is my own area of expertise- additionally, as discussed below,
overrides explain a new divergence in causation standards
between federal and Texas employment discrimination
law. However, these questions arise in all areas of statutory
law, and the suggestions for identifying and implementing
overrides outlined below could be applied in any area of
statutory practice.
I. Identifying Overrides
The first step in properly implementing an override is simply
knowing that it has been enacted. This is harder than it
sounds. There is no single comprehensive list of overrides.
The best resource is probably a major study by Professor
Bill Eskridge and Matt Christiansen, published in 2014,
that sought to identify all overrides enacted between 1967
and 2011 that superseded prior Supreme Court decisions. 2
This study makes several important contributions, but for
practicing lawyers and judges, the most helpful part may be
the appendix that lists all of the overrides and identifies the
specific cases they superseded It is important to recognize,
however, that earlier studies have suggested that Congress
supersedes circuit and lower court decisions frequently as
well, and these overrides are not included in the study. Nor
does the study include any overrides enacted by state or
local legislatures.
Importantly, lawyers cannot assume that Westlaw or Lexis
will reliably flag precedents that have been superseded by
statute.' The coding protocols employed by both companies
generally rely onjudicial signals regarding when subsequent
developments affect the validity
es, Lexis and of a prior precedent. In contexts
a court indicates governed by common law, or whenit is a court decision that overrules a
t a statutory prior court decision, this works well,
the viability of a since a lower court cannot supersede
fore flagging the a higher court's decision. But it does
y way. not work well when it is Congress,
rather than a court, that supersedes
a precedent. In most instances, Lexis
and Westlaw wait until a court indicates in a decision that a
statutory amendment affects the viability of a prior precedent
before flagging the case in any way. Moreover, if it is a Supreme
Court decision that has been superseded, Westlaw will only
"yellow" flag the prior decision, rather than red flag it, unless
the Supreme Court itself indicates that its prior decision was
superseded by Congressional action.
In a recent article, I looked at how quickly Westlaw flagged
the overrides identified by the Christiansen & Eskridge study,
and I found that on average, it took almostfour years (!) before
an overridden case was flagged by any lower court.5 There are
important variations here, however. Restorative overrides-in
which Congress repudiates the prior decision as contrary
to Congress's original intent-are typically flagged quite
quickly (the median lag time was only about four months).
This is probably because the statutory language itself often
castigates the prior decision and because the "fight" between
Congress and the Supreme Court often generates a lot of press
attention. Such restorative overrides- however- are rather rare.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
nc
til
tha
=ts
be
an
ADVOCATE * SUMMER 2015
The vast majority of overrides identified in the Christiansen
& Eskridge study update or clarify statutory law without
suggesting that the prior decision was necessarily "wrong."
Indeed, the Supreme Court often specifically asks Congress
to enact such overrides to address ambiguities or anomalies
in existing law. Such overrides generally receive less press
attention, and it typically takes several years before the prior
precedents are flagged as superseded in Westlaw.
Accordingly, best practice for lawyers and judges in statutory
cases should be to review carefully the statutory language
that governs a dispute before reflexively following court
precedents interpreting the statute. If the court precedents
predate amendments to the statutory language, the precedent and
the new statutory language needs to be analyzed to determine
whether and to what extent the amendments supersede the
pre-existing interpretation. In conducting this research, it
may be helpful to consult the full public law that enacted
the amendment, rather than simply the codified code section
at issue, because the session law may include findings and
purpose clauses that demonstrate the legislature's intent to
supersede a prior precedent. Additionally, relevant context
may be found in guidance or regulations issued by agencies,
secondary sources, and legislative history such as committee
reports on the bill.
II. Applying Overrides
Once a lawyer identifies that a statutory amendment relates
to a pre-existing precedent, the lawyer-and ultimately the
court-has to determine the extent to which the override
supersedes the prior precedent. There are several reasons
why courts might continue properly to cite to an overridden
precedent. First, most overrides are prospective rather than
retrospective. Accordingly, facts that arose prior to the enact-
ment of an override are generally decided under pre-override
law, even if the decision comes after the override. Second, an
override may not override all aspects of the prior decision
and a court must determine when to follow the new statu-
tory language and when to follow the prior precedent. The
first part of this section demonstrates that courts sometimes
simply make mistakes- they follow aspects of an overridden
precedent-or lower court decisions that rely on an over-
ridden precedent-that are unquestionably superseded.
The second part of this section discusses some of the more
complicated interpretive questions that can arise where it is
unclear which should control.
A. Clearly Superseded
Sometimes, courts continue to cite overridden precedents for
propositions that are no longer good law. In a working paper,
I illustrate this by looking at the implementation of the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA).6 This was a bipartisan
bill that was passed by landslide majorities in the House and
the Senate and was signed by President George W. Bush.
The ADAAA superseded prior Supreme Court cases that had
interpreted the definition of "disability" in the Americans with
Disabilities Act quite narrowly. Congress was quite clear that
it thought that the Court had misinterpreted the original law.
The ADAAA includes statutory findings that state the earlier
cases "narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to
be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protections for
many individuals whom Congress intended to protect," and
statutory "purpose" clauses that explicitly "reject" several
distinct aspects of these earlier cases.
r
The ADAAA has had a significant effect. Citations to the
overridden decisions have fallen dramatically, and in many
instances courts are correctly applying the new law. But there
are also numerous decisions that improperly continue to
follow the overridden precedents. For example, the ADAAA
expressly superseded the Supreme Court's interpretation of
what a plaintiff needs to prove to succeed on a claim that
she was discriminated against because she was "regarded
as" having a disability8' Some courts, however, continue to
apply the old standard, often citing to the ADAAA for other
propositions but asserting (incorrectly) that the Supreme
Court's holding on this point remains good law.
9
The ADAAA also removed the "roots"-i.e., Supreme Court
precedents-that underlie a significant body of circuit and
district court precedent, and courts should reconsider reliance
on the cases that grew from those decisions. Courts, however,
sometimes continue to rely on pre-ADAAA circuit precedent
that applied the (now) superseded decisions to determine
whether particular health conditions can be a qualifying
disability, without reconsidering how the ADAAA should
change this analysis.10
My findings regarding errors in implementing the ADAAA are
particularly troubling because the ADAAA was quite explicit
in repudiating the prior precedents, and it received extensive
coverage in the popular and legal press. The prevalence of
mistakes in this context suggests that there are probably
much bigger problems implementing overrides that are less
well known. This is also suggested by a different study that
I am currently completing, which shows that number of
citations to cases superseded by non-restorative overrides
barely changes after the override. Put simply, such overrides
often seem to fail to actually override.1
The solution here is easy. Once lawyers and courts realize
that an override may have bearing on the resolution of a case,
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they simply need to read carefully the new statutory language
and determine how it relates to prior precedents, including
not only the Supreme Court precedents directly superseded,
but also circuit or district court decisions that had relied on
those prior precedents.
B. Arguably Superseded
Harder questions emerge when it is debatable whether the
relevant aspect of a prior precedent is superseded by the
amendment. I have looked at this in two different contexts.
First, it may be unclear whether an override supersedes the
reasoning underlying a decision as well as the specific holding
of a decision. For example, in 1978, Congress superseded
an (in)famous Supreme Court decision that had held that
pregnancy was not a form of sex discrimination. In recent
years, however, courts have disagreed about whether the over-
ridden decision should control cases concerning breastfeeding
or prescription contraception 2
Second, courts have struggled to determine whether an
override of a judicial interpretation of one statute affects
interpretations of similar language in other statutes.1 3 In the
employment discrimination context, this has been illustrated
by a series of decisions regarding what causation standard
should govern claims. In 1991, Congress overrode a decision
interpreting Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, sex, religion, color, and national origin, by
amending the statute to state explicitly that a plaintiff can
win a law suit if she shows that any of these grounds was
a "motivating factor" in an adverse employment action. 1
Congress, however, did not amend any of the other employ-
ment discrimination statutes modeled on Title VII, or Title
VII's separate retaliation provisions. The Supreme Court has
recently taken the position Congress's "failure" to separately
amend these provisions should be interpreted as a preference
for a more stringent causation standard-"but for" causa-
tion-to govern these other contexts.
5
The Supreme Court's decisions in this area explain a new
divergence between Texas and federal laws regarding employ-
ment discrimination. Shortly after the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act was
likewise amended to include a "motivating factor" standard.6
The TCHRA prohibits discrimination on all of the grounds
addressed in Title VII, and also, in the same sentence, age
and disability. This was not particularly significant until the
Supreme Court held that federal claims on the basis of age are
governed by a but-for causation standard, and many courts
have followed this decision to hold that a but-for standard
governs federal disability claims as well." Thus, claims on
the basis of age or disability under the TCHRA should now
be analyzed separately from analogous federal claims, because
the plaintiff's burden on causation is lower."' It may be
appropriate to interpret Texas retaliation claims separately
as well, because the TCHRA retaliation provisions does not
include the "because of" language that was significant in the
Supreme Court's decision regarding the federal causation
standard for retaliation claims. 
19
More generally, the U.S. Supreme Court has given mixed
signals regarding how to resolve these kinds of ambiguities
when interpreting overrides. It has sometimes suggested
the prior precedent remains controlling, except where
unquestionably superseded by statutory language directly on
point.20 But it has also sometimes suggested that an override
functionally erased a prior precedent entirely and restored
prior understandings of the issue, even if they were not
addressed in the text of the override itself.2 In my academic
writing, I have criticized the former approach and advocated
for interpretive conventions that give more weight to the
effect of an override. But for lawyers representing clients,
these conflicting instructions can be helpful, in that one
can take whichever position on the effect on an override is
advantageous to one's client.
III. Conclusion
Overrides are fundamental to ensuring that the legislative
branch can play its expected role as the ultimate authority on
statutory law. Overrides, however, are not self-implementing.
As described above, courts sometimes continue to rely on
overridden precedents where they have clearly been super-
seded. There are also contexts where it is ambiguous whether
the override or the prior precedent should control, leading to
widespread confusion and considerable litigation to sort out
the ambiguities. In the hard cases, courts are trapped in a
difficult situation because they receive mixed signals as to how
to resolve these interpretative complexities. I have suggested
that this could be addressed by clearer drafting by Congress
and reconsidering the interpretative methodologies applied
to overrides. But the solution for the easier cases is far more
basic. Lawyers and courts simply need to begin their analysis
in statutory cases by reading the statutory language itself and
carefully evaluating whether judicial precedents that predate
the current version of that statute need to be reconsidered.
Deborah A. Widiss is an Associate Professor of Law at the Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. *
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RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
ADVOCATE * SUMMER 2015
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 511 (2009).
S ee Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congres-
sional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
1967-2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014); see also James Buatti &
Richard L. Hasen, Response: Conscious Congressional Overriding of
the Supreme Court, Gridlock, and Partisan Politics --- TEX. L. REV.
SEE ALSO (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2530114 (study of "conscious" overrides
since 1991).
3 See Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 1480-1514.
The research summarized in this section is from Widiss, Identifying
Congressional Overrides Should Not Be This Hard, supra note 1, at
155-62.
5 ee id. at 158.
6 5ee Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin' After All These Years: Sutton
and Toyota As Shadow Precedents (draft on file with author).
Pub. L. 110-325, §2(a) & (b).
Id. at §2(a)(3), § 4(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)).
9 See, e.g., Koessel v. Sublette County Sheriff's Dep't, 717 F.3d 736,
742 (1 0 ,h Cir. 2013); Wingfield v. Escallate, LLC, 512-CV-2620,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139885, "15-16 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2014)
(both mistakenly relying on prior 'regarded as' standard).
1o 5ee, e.g., Morris v. Town of Islip, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133168,
2014 WL 4700227 (EDNY 2014) (relying on pre-ADAAA case law
regarding lifting restrictions); Wanamaker v. Westport Bd. of Educ.,
899 F. Supp.2d 193, 211-12 (D. Ct. 2012) (relying on pre-ADAAA
case law regarding pregnancy complications), but see, e.g., Feldman
v. Law Enforcement Assocs. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 2d 472, 483
n.3 (E.D.N.C. 2011) (pre-ADAAA cases may "carry little, if any,
precedential weight with respect to the issue of [disabilityl").
11 See Brian Broughman & Deborah A. Widiss, After the Override:
An Empirical Analysis of Shadow Precedent (draft on file with author).
12 See Widiss, Shadow Precedents, supra note 1, at 551-56 (discussing
issue and collecting cases).
13 See generally Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides, supra
note 1 (discussing issue and collecting cases).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
15 Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013); Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).
16 Tex. Labor Code § 21.125 (enacted by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch.
76 (S.B. 959), § 9.05(a)).
17 Gross, 557 U.S. at 177; see, e.g., Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.,
681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir. 2012) (discussing issue and following
Gross in ADA case).
iS Federal district courts have recognized that TCHRA claims for
age discrimination are governed by a motivating factor standard that
now differs from that applied under federal law. 5ee, e.g., Bleiweiss
v. Panduit Sales Corp., CV H-13-0080, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS,
at *14 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2015); Julian v. City of Houston, No.
4:12-CV-2973, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104935, at *10 (S.D. Tex.
July 31, 2014). However, they do not seem to be doing the kind of
separate analysis that may well be warranted. Cf. Quantum Chem.
Corp. v. Toennies, 47 SW.3d 473, 480 (Tx. 2001) (failure to use
motivating factor standard was reversible error).
9 Tex. Labor Code § 21.055.
'0 5ee, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire, 550 U.S. 618, 627 n.2
(2007), superseded by Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. 111-2
(2009).
21 5ee, e.g., CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 454
(2008).
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
